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explanation suffices for Crowell 4 Benon, 3 6 since it was a decision interpreting the Longshoreman's Act,37 a compensation law. However, the minority pointed out that no other lower federal court had allowed a trial
de nova, while they had generally held that a record of the findings of the
deputy commissioner must be accepted as conclusive, unless there was
some irregularity in the proceedings before him.38
It is submitted that, unless a fundamental or substantive question of
law is involved, the administrative method of making awards should be
final asto facts, where there has been proper procedure before an impartial tribunal. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of such legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous and inexpensive method of dealing
with a class of questions of fact, which are peculiarly suited to an examination and determination by an administrative agent, who is especially
fitted and assigned to the task and where there is great public interest in
summary action, and would make it a mere ministerial body of the court.39
J. H. H.
EVIDENCE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SELF-INCRIMINATION APPLIED TO
METHOD or IDENTIFICATION-It appeared from the testimony of the assistant cashier that the person who robbed the bank had worn a mask and
had about a two-day growth of beard on his face. Defendant was held in
jail several hours preceding his identification that he might develop a beard
to correspond to that worn by the bank robber. When defendant was
brought before the assistant cashier, a handkerchief was placed over his
face in, as he contends, violation of his constitutional guarantee against
being forced to testify against himself. Held, defendant was not forced to
testify against himself.'
The Constitutions of the United States2 and of Indiana3 guarantee the
freedom from compulsory self-incrimination in their respective jurisdictions.
The rule, however, originated as a mere rule of evidence in the common
law as a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating accused
persons which reached their climax in cruelty in the Star Chamber in England.4 It has been codified by constitutional or statutory enactments in
the United States, which codification is merely declaratory of the common
law, neither limiting nor enlarging it.5
The privilege has generally been held to protect a person from any disclosure sought by legal process against him as a witness. 6 Consequently, it
would seem that it should apply only to testimonial evidence by word of
mouth, and not to physical facts, and the text writers have so expressed
"Supra, Note 34.
March 4, 1927, 33 U. 8. C. A., § 904.
MSupra, Note 30.

1 Thompsonv. Hoch (iy.

1895), 33 S. W. 96.

21oss v. State (Ind. Sup. Ct., Oct. 26, 1932), 182 N. E. 865.
2United States Constitution, Amendment V.
3 Indiana Constitution, Article I, Sec. 14.
44 Wigmore (2d Ed.), Sec. 2250 (1923) ; Jones (3d Ed.), Evidence, See. 884,
(1924).

5Counselman v. H tchcok (1892), 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. Ed. 1110, 12 Sup. Ct
195; Emery v. State (1899), 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145.
6Wigmore, op. cit., Ge. 2263.
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themselves.7

The reasons given for the existence of the privilege are that

such evidence obtained by threats or false promises is likely to be unreliable and false, and that the prosecution should not be allowed to trust to
compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof. These reasons apply only
to oral testimony and not to physical facts which exist regardless of threats
or promises made to the witness and which cannot be furnished by him,
innocent or guilty. However, in the early history of American jurisprudence, the courts, in a zealous desire to protect the innocent, extended the

privilege past its logical limits, and a great conflict in the cases has arisen
as to what evidence the privilege protects. The difficulties have arisen in
cases where acts of the witness have been claimed to be within the privilege.
The courts have rather uniformly held that for purposes of identification, the defendant may be compelled to stand and face the jury or a wit8
ness without violation of his privilege against self-incrimination.
To
require the defendant to face the jury is not making him furnish evidence
of his guilt. As the Iowa court explained,9 the rule contended for, i. e.,
extending the privilege to such acts, if carried to its logical extreme, would
allow the defendant to remain concealed during the entire trial lest his
presence might aid in his identification. Even here, however, the courts
are not all in accord, and in Alabama and Georgia the privilege seems to
10
have been extended even to this act.
It is generally held that the privilege does not extend to forcibly taking
shoes of defendant and comparing them with tracks made near or at the
scene of the crime in order to connect the defendant with the crime," and
the testimony of the officer or person making the comparison is admissible.
1

Wigmore, op. cit., Sec. 2265; Greenleaf (16th Ed.) Evidence, Sec. 469e (1899).
State v. Clark (1930), 156 Wash. 543, 287 Pac. 18; State v. Wormack (1921),
150 Minn. 249, 184 N. W. 970; State v. Ruck (1906), 194 Mo. 416, 92 S. W. 706;
State v. Gartrell (1903), 171 Mo. 509, 71 S. W. 1045; Beason v. State (1902), (Tex.
Cr. R.), 69 S. W. 165; People v. Oliveria (1899), 128 Calif. 376, 59 Pac. 772; State
'v. Reasby (1896), 100 Iowa 341, 69 N. W. 451;. People v. Gardner (1894), 144 N. Y.
119, 38 N. E 1003, 28 L. R. A. 669, 43 Am. St. Rep. 741; People v. Goldenson
(1883), 76 Calif. 328, 19 Pac. 161; Williams v. State (1893), 98 Ala. 52, 13 So. 333.
9
State v. Reasby (1896), 100 Iowa 331, 69 N. W. 451.
10Wells v. State (1924), 20 Ala. App. 240, 101 So. 624, Ex parte State (1924),
211 Ala. 616, 101 So. 626, where the court held it error to compel defendant to stand
to enable witness to testify whether or not his size and build resembled that of the
guilty person as being self-incrimination. Blaokwell v. State (1881), 67 Ga. 76, 44
Am. Rep. 717, forcing defendant to stand to determine where his leg was amputated.
Also see State v. Jacobs (1858), 50 N. C. (5 Jones) 259. Contra, State v. Garret
(1874), 71 N. C. 85, 17 Am. Rep. 1.
"Biggs v.State (1929), 201 Ind. 200, 167 N. E. 9; Ricketts v. State (1923), 23
Okla. Cr. 267, 215 Pac. 212, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 164 (1924); Goodbarry v. State
(1931), (Okla.), 296 Pac. 985; State v. Griffin (1924), 129 S. C. 200, 124 S. E. 81,
34 A. L. R. 1227, 9 Minn. L. Rev. 158 (1925), followed in State V. Smith (1925),
133 S. C. 291, 130 S. E. 884; Chase v. State (1924), 97 Tex. Cr. R. 349, 261 S. W.
574; Landry -v. State (1931), 117 Tex. Cr. R. 396, 35 S. W. (2d) 433; People v.
Brien (1916), 190 MIch. 39, 158 N. W. 142; Thornton v. State (1903), 117 Wis. 338,
93 N. W. 1107, 98 Am. St. Rep. 924; State v. Thompson (1912), 161 N. C. 238, 76
S. E. 249; State 'v.
Fuller (1906), 34 Mont. 12, 85 Pac. 369, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 762,
9 Ann. Cas. 648; State v. Sanders (1906), 75 S. C. 409, 56 S. E. 35; Erans v. State
(1905), 75 Nebr. 294, 106 N. W. 27; People v. Van Wormer (1903), 175 N. Y. 188,
67 N. E. 299; State v. Graham (1876), 74 N. C. 646.
8
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Here again, Georgia and Alabama are contra.12 The defendant may also be
forced to put his foot into tracksls or may be compelled to make tracks for
comparison with others14 without being forced to testify against himself.
Forcing defendant to exhibit his feet to the witness and jury so that the
witness might identify the size thereof with the size of tracks near the
crime is not self-incrimination.15 Of course, where the defendant complies
voluntarily, no question of self-incrimination is raised since, even if the
privilege does exist, it is waived. Evidence by witnesses who had recently
examined defendant's feet, is competent on the question of footprints and
alleged peculiar structure of defendant's feet.16
It has been held that it is not self-incrimination to take the defendant
to the scene of the crime and compel him to stand outside the window in
the same position in which the alleged assailant stood for purposes of identification.17 Other cases have been found, in one of which a bank robbery
was re-enacted by the accused,18 and in the other the one accused of murder by strangulation was asked to, and did place his hands upon the throat
of the deceased, his fingers fitting into the marks,19 but in both cases, the
defendants complied voluntarily so that no question of privilege was raised,
waiver taking care of the privilege if it existed. On principle, there is no
reason for extending the privilege to these cases, since the defendant is not
being forced to testify in his capacity of witness any more than if his boot
were used for comparison with tracks or he was compelled to stand in
court for identification.
The courts are not so uniform as to whether the privilege protects defendant from being forced to don or remove wearing apparel. However,
the present tendency, as shown by courts adopting the broader view of the
2
privilege, is that such testimony is admissible. In Holt v. United States, 0
Mr. Justice Holmes said that "the prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." A witness was
there allowed to testify as to the fit of a blouse which the defendant was
forced to put on. A strong case in Nevada 2 1 held that forcing accused to
roll up his sleeves against his will to show tattooing for identification is not
VDay v. State (1879), 64 Ga. 668; Cooper v. State (1889), 86 Ala. 610, 6 So.
110, 13
11 Am. St. Rep. 84; Davis v. State (1902), 131 Ala. 10, 31 So. 569.
Magee v. State (1908), 93 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529; State v. Graham (1876), 74
N. C. 646; Lansford v. State (1916), 80 Tex. Cr. R. 413, 190 S. W. 157; State v.
Romero (1930), 34 N. M. 494, 285 Pac. 497.
"State v. Barela (1917), 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545; Johnson v. State (1922),
91 Tex. Cr. R. 291, 168 S. W. 933.
13State v. Prudhomme (1873), 25 La. 522. But see Stokes v. State (1875), 5
Baxt. (Tenn.) 619, 30 Am. Rep. 72, where it was held that defendant cannot be
forced to place his foot in a pan of mud In the presence of the jury to make a
footprint.
1
6Lipes v. State (1885), 15 Lea (Tenn.) 125, 54 Am. St. Rep. 402.
1
TState v. Neville (1918), 175 N. C. 731, 95 S. E. 55. Contra, Aiken v. State
(1915), 16 Ga. App. 848, 86 S. B. 1076.
18People v. Fisher (1930), 340 DI. 216, 172 N. B. 743.
"People v. Collins (1923), 223 Mich. 303, 193 N. W. 858.
2- 1(1910), 218 Ul.S. 245.
State v. Ah Chuey (1879), 14 Nev. 79, 33 Am. Rep. 530.
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self-incrimination. The purpose of the rule is to prevent falsehoods from
threats, false hopes and promises. Evidence discovered in this manner
could not lead to a falsehood. Indiana adopted this broad view in O'Brien
22
v. State, where the defendant, having refused to be examined, was handcuffed and forcibly examined against his will and was held not to have been
forced to testify against himself. Other jurisdictions have likewise adopted
24
23
although the court in State v. Nordstrom attempted to limit
the rule,
it to those portions of his body which are usually not concealed. Defendant
may be forced to remove a veil, hat, or other article of clothing hiding his
face and thus expose his face to the view of the court, jury and witnesses.25
Other courts have not been required to decide whether or not defendant
might be compelled to put on or remove clothing for identification, since
they have been able to find that there was no showing of force employed,
but that the defendant voluntarily consented to the experiment. Thus,
where witness put on certain articles of wearing apparel and a cap and
2
2
sat in an automobile, 6 where accused tried on a pair of shoes, 7 where
prosecutor was taken to jail in which accused was confined, and a hat was
placed on accused's head,28 where a hat was placed on accused and ar29
ranged in a certain manner, where defendant stood before the jury with
30
or
a handkerchief over his face and a broad brimmed hat on his head,
identificaclothes
for
where defendant grew a mustache and wore certain
tion, 3 1 the court allowed the evidence, there being no showing of compulsion. Evidence that after arrest the sheriff took the defendant around town
for the purpose of identification was not forcing him to testify against
himself.32
The instant case could be justified, as were the above illustrations, that
there was no showing that the defendant did not consent to the identification. However, the court did not stop there, but reaffirmed the broader and,
to the writer, more reasonlable rule adopted in the O'Brien case, supra,
that the privilege is "freedom from testimonial compulsion."
= (1890), 125 Ind. 3S, 25 N. E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323.

nState v. Miller (1905), 71 N. J. Law 527, 60 AU. 202; Territory v. Chung
Nung (1912), 21 Hawaii 214; State v. Oschoa (1926), 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582, 24
Mich. L. Rev. 617 (1926).
2' (1893), 7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac. 382.
"Rice v. Rice (1891), 47 N. J. Eq. 559, 21 Atl. 2S6; People v. Gardner, (1894),
144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003, 28 L. R. A. 669, 43 Am. St. Rep. 741; White v. Warivick (1877), 76 N. C. 175; Thornton v. State (1903), 117 Wis. 338, 93 N. W. 1107,
98 Am. St. Rep. 924. But see Turnon v. State (1906), 50 Tex. Cr. R. 7, 95 S. W.
553, holding state may not require defendant to place a cap on his head in court
room. Compare White v. State (1901), 62 S. W. 749, where it was allowed when
the act was done in jail before the trial.
2- Rogers v. State (1923), 180 Wis. 568, 193 N. W. 612.
2fPeople v. Keep (1900), 123 Mich. 231, 51 N. W. 1097. But see People v. Mead
(1883), 50 Mich. 228, 15 N. W. 95, where the court, in dictum, indicated that he
could not be forced.
2sWhite v. State (1S77), 76 N. C. 175; Crenshaw v. State (1932), (Ala.) 142
So. 669.
2 State v. Bauenore (1927), 193 N. C. 336, 137 S. E. 172.
3' Gallah v. State (1889), 28 Tex. App. 248, 12 S. W. 107.
31Commonwealth v. Bassi (1925), 284 Pa. S1, 130 Atl. 311.
nStone v. State (1932), - Tex. Cr. R. -, 50 S. W. (2d) 301.
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Taking of fingerprints, Bertillon records, and photographs, although the
defendant is forced to do an act which connects him with the crime, are now
3
uniformly recognized as outside the privilege. 3
In cases where the defense of insanity has been raised, thus putting
into issue the mental condition of the defendant, the courts allow an examination of the defendant, even over his objection, by the prosecution's
physicians and alienists, and hold it to be outside the privilege against selfincrimination.3 4 A statute authorizing the court to appoint an alienist to
examine a defendant raising the defense of insanity is not unconstitutional
as requiring self-incrimination.35 The courts, however, begin to differ on
other questions of physical examination. Thus, one court upheld,36 another
refused to upholda7 a compulsory physical examination of defendant to
determine whether he was intoxicated when arrested for driving a motor
vehicle. Of course, if the defendant voluntarily submits to an examination
by a physician, the latter may testify as to scars, bites, wounds, bruises
and scratches which he discovers on his person and which tend to identify
him with the crime.3 8 In rape cases where the prosecutrix has been afflicted with a venereal disease as a result of the assault, the courts have
been rather loath to force an examination of the defendant to ascertain
whether or not he is so afflicted, and, when a forcible examination has been
made, have refused to allow evidence thereof.39 The courts are in accord
on the general statement that such evidence obtained by forcible examination is inadmissible and that they have no power to compel it. The question
on which they differ, however, is as to what constitutes consent to the exami33

Fingerprints: Garcia v. State (1924), 26 Ariz. 597, 229 Pac. 103; State v.
Johnson (1932), (W. Va.), 164 S. E. 31; McGarry v. State (1918), 82 Tex. Cr. R.
597, 200 S. W. 527; People v. Jones (1931), - Calif. -,
296 Paa. 317; People v.
Sallow (1917), 165 N. Y. S. 15, 100 Misc. Rep. 447; U. S. v. Kelly (1932), 55 Fed.
(2d) 67; Mabry v. Kettering (1909), 92 Ark. 81, 122 S. W. 115; Bartletta v.
McFeeley (1930), 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 Atl. 17; 8 Calif. L. Rev. 25 (1919). Bertillon measurements and photographs: Downs v. Swann (1909), 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl.
653, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 739, 134 Am. St. Rep. 586; State ex rel. Bruns v. Clausmeier (1900), 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541, 30 L. R. A. 73, 77 Am. St. Rep. 511;
People v. Carey (1901), 125 Mich. 535, 84 N. W. 1087; Shaffer v. United States
(1904), 24 App. D. C. 417.
4
3 State v. Genna (1927), 163 La. 701, 112 -o. 665, certiorari denied, 48 Sup.
Ct 22; Waters v. State (1928), 22 Ala. App. 644, 119 So. 248; State v. Spangler
(1916), 92 Wash. 636, 159 Pac. 810; State v. White (1920), 113 Wash. 416, 194
Pac. 390; State v. Cerar (1922), 60 Utah 208, 207 Pa. 597; State V. Coleman
(1924), 96 W. Va. 544, 123 S. E. 580; Blacker v. State (1926), 92 Fla. 878, 110 So.
547; People v. Truck (1902), 170 N. Y. 203, 63 N. E. 281; Wehenkel v. State
(1928), 116 Neb. 493, 218 N. W. 137.
,People v. Strong (1931), (Calif.) 300 Pac. 84. See See. 2291, Burns' Ann.
St. (1929), and 4 Ind. L. 3. 456 (1929).
-"Noe v. Monmouth County Common Pleas Court (1928), 6 N. J. MIsc. Rep.
1016,3 7143 Atl. 750, Aff'd., 150 At. 920.
People v. Dennis (1928), 131 MIisc. Rep. 62, 226 N. Y. S. 689.
"State v. Struble (1887), 71 Iowa 11, 32 N. W. 1; State v. Jones (1906), 153
Mo. 457, 55 S. W. 80; State v. Tettaton (1900), 159 Mo. 354, 60 S. W. 743; People
v. Wittersheim (1930), 252 Mich. 538, 233 N. W. 407; State v. Vanderhaar (1922),
106 Ohio St. 340, 140 N. E. 840; Hooks v. State (1924), 97 Tex. Cr. R. 480, 261
S. W. 1053; State v. Grimmell (1901), 116 Iowa 596, 88 N. W. 342; State v.Miller
(1915), 71 N. J. Law 527, 60Atl. 202.
SState v. Newcomb (1909), 220 Mo. 54, 118 S. W. 405; State v.Height (1902),
117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935, 59 L. R. A. 437, 94 Am. St. Rep. 323.
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nation, one line of cases adopting the view that mere silence and failure to
object is not consent, 4 0 the other adopting a more liberal view as to
waiver, 41 and one case 42 held that testimony of physicians who examined
defendant that he was suffering from a venereal disease was admissible,
when there was no showing whether or not there was consent. The state
may not force the prosecutrix to submit to a physical examination to ascertain whether or not she has been leading a virtuous life when defendant
in a rape case contends that she has not.43 There may be some ground of
public policy on which the evidence should be inadmissible, or the power to
compel it within the discretion of the court, but it should not be refused on
the ground that it is self-incrimination since the facts disclosed are present
whether the defendant is innocent or guilty, and he is certainly not making evidence against himself.
In Johnson v. Commonwealt&44 the court held that where defendant consented to arising and repeating certain words so that witness might identify his voice, he had waived any privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court went further, however, and stated, in dictum, that even had be objected, the mere repeating of words for identification purposes would be a
"strained construction" of the clause against self-incrimination.
Statutes requiring operators of cars to stop in case of an accident and
give their names, licenses, etc., have been held constitutional, 45 although
Ohio refused to uphold such a statute where it required the full report of
the accident. 4 6 The rationale of these cases has been, however, that such
requirements are a proper exercise of the police power of the state.
4
Some writers have advocated a complete abandonment of the privilege. 7
That, however, could not be expected, nor would it be wise. However, with
a view to the "crime wave" and the recognized difficulties of convicting
notorious criminals, it would seem wiser to limit the privilege to its reasonable and logical bounds, i. e., testimonial evidence. An examination of
the physical person of the defendant for identification or connection with
the crime, Bertillon records, finger prints, photographs, the making of
tracks, assuming positions, donning clothes, repeating words for identifica6OState v'. Horton (1913), 247 Mo. 657, 153 S. W. 1051; State v. Matsinger
(1915), ISO S. W. 856; Bethel vn. State (1928), 178 Ark. 277, 10 S. W. (2d) 370,
24 III. Rev. 487; Blaokwell v. State (181), 67 Ga. 76; People v. Akens (1914),
25 Cal. App. 373, 143 Pac. 795.
"Spicer v. State (1881), 69 Ala. 159; Waters vn. State (1928), 119 So. 248;
People vn. Glover (1888), 71 Mich. 303, 38 N. W. 874; People v. Corder (1928), 244
Mich. 274, 221 N. -. 309,-notes in 29 Colum. L. Rev. 214 (1929), and 27 Mich.
L. Rev. 471 (1929), criticize the extension of the privilege to examination since it
Is not testimonial evidence; Garcia v. State (1929), 35 Ariz. 35, 274 Pac. 166.
"Martinez v. State (1923), 96 Tex. Cr. R. 138, 256 S. W. 289.
"Rettig v. State (1921), 90 Tex. Cr. R. 142, 233 S. W. 839; Thomas v. Commonwealth (1920), 188 Xy. 509, 222 'S. W. 951.
44 (1887), 115 Pa. St. 369, 9 AU. 78.
"Woods v. State (1916), 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129; People 'V. Rosenheim
. 430, Ann. Cas. 1915A 161, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.)
(1913), 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N.
977; State v. Sherring (1916), 78 N. E. 220, 98 Atl. 482; Ex parte Rneedler (1912),
243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983; State v. Razey (1929), 129 Kan. 328, 282 Pac. 755,
66 A. L. R. 1225.
"Rembrandt v. City of Cleveland (1927), 28 Ohio App. 4, 161 N. D. 364,
criticized In 28 Colun-. L. Rev. 971 (1928) and 13 Mlnn. L. Rev. 150 (1929).
4771 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 69 (1922); 35 W. Va. L. Quart. 143 (1929).
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tion of voice and writing name for comparison of signature were never intended to be included in the privilege. No coercion, nor hope, nor fear can
change the physical facts obtained by such comparison.
P. C. R.
NnGrLiGENCF-PHYsIcrAN AND Su Eox-ExPE&T TFSTIMONY-Appellant,
a surgeon, performed a surgical operation on appellee to remove a tumor
"or growth of some kind" from appellee's abdominal cavity. An absorbent
sponge used to "wall off" the intestines was left in the incision which caused
irritation and made a second operation necessary for its removal. Appellee
sued for damages caused by the alleged negligence of the appellant in letting the sponge remain. Nurses were relied on by the appellant to check the
number of sponges to be used that all were removed. By testimony of
physicians and surgeons, appellant proved on the trial that the recognized
and accepted methods of surgery had been followed. There was no testimony of a physician or surgeon to the contrary. A jury found for the
appellee and the trial court entered judgment in her favor upon the verdict. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court, holding that the question of whether or not a physician or surgeon has in a given case exercised reasonable care is a question of science for experts. The Supreme
Court transferred the cause under Section 1357, Cl. 2, Burns 1926, Acts
1901, p. 565, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.1
It was contended by appellant that testimony of experts was necessary
to prove the alleged negligence of the appellant and the Appellate Court
so held. Most of the malpractice cases involve a failure in duty or lack
of skill. This is ordinarily a question of scientific knowledge about which
the layman is not competent to testify and when an issue does involve
scientific knowledge, expert testimony is necessary.2 Authorities are numerous to sustain this proposition. But this rule applies only where a
scientific question is involved. There are apparent exceptions to this general rule as where the defendant is so clearly at fault that no scientific
knowledge is necessary to place that fault, and therefore no expert testimony is required.S The instant case is such a case. Speaking of the similar case of Ault v. HaZl, supra, where nurses were relied'on to count the
sponges, Professor Francis H. Bohlen said: "The Supreme Court of Ohio,
none the less held that the jury might find that the surgeon was liable. At
first glance this seems contrary to the general view of American courts
in regard to the liability of physicians. However, the general rule applies
only to determine the professional skill, the extent of knowledge of the
act which a patient in a particular locality is entitled to expect. Of such
matters the ordinary lay witness is no judge, or at least the medical pro' Funk v. Bonham, bSupreme Court of Indiana, July 29, 1932, 183 N. BJ. 312.
2
Bwing v. Goode (1897), 78 Fed. 442; Adolay v. Miller (1916), 60 Ind. App.
656, 111 N. R.313; Longfellow v. Vernon (1914), 57 Ind. App. 611, 105 N. E. 178;
Jackson v. Burnham (1895), 20 Colo. 532, 39 Fa. 577; Sawyer v. Berthold (1912),
116 Minn. 441, 134 N. W. 120; McCoy v. Buck (1927), 87 Ind. App. 433, 157 N. E.
456.
aEvans v. Roberts (1915), 172 Iowa 653, 154 N. W. 923; Wharton v. Warner
(1913), 75 Wash. 470, 135 Paa. 235, 237; Reynolds v. Smith (1910), 148 Iowa 271,
127 X. W. 192; Walker Hospital v. Pulley (1920), 74 Ind. App. 659, 664, 127 N. E.
559; Ault v. Hall (1928), 119 Ohio St 422, 164 N. .. 518.

